Sedimentary Innovation: How Regulation Should Respond to Incremental Change by Ford, Cristie
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications 
2017 
Sedimentary Innovation: How Regulation Should Respond to 
Incremental Change 
Cristie Ford 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, ford@allard.ubc.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Citation Details 
Cristie Ford, "Flexible Regulation Scholarship Blossoms and Diversifies: 1980-2012" in Cristie Ford, 
Innovation and the State: Finance, Regulation, and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming). 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard 
Research Commons. For more information, please contact petrovic@allard.ubc.ca, elim.wong@ubc.ca. 
CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE, CHAPTER 8  
(NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FORTHCOMING 2017)  
 
 1 
SEDIMENTARY INNOVATION: HOW REGULATION SHOULD RESPOND TO 
INCREMENTAL CHANGE 
Table	of	Contents	
Sedimentary	innovation:	responding	to	incremental	change	..................................	1	
What	is	“sedimentary	innovation”?	............................................................................................	1	
Sedimentary	innovation	as	regulatory	opportunity	and	regulatory	challenge	..........	4	The	impact	of	network	effects:	Brandeis	and	the	“swarm”	..........................................................	8	
Making	sense	of	sedimentary	innovation	..............................................................................	16	Humans	struggle	to	see	sedimentary	change	...................................................................................	16	Epistemological	problems	and	awareness	problems	...................................................................	19	Regulatory	boundaries	and	coordination	problems	.....................................................................	21	Sedimentary	innovation	and	flexible	regulation	.............................................................................	22	
Potential	regulatory	responses	to	sedimentary	innovation	............................................	23	
 
What is “sedimentary innovation”? 
For all their splashiness, the radical (or “seismic” innovations) described in the last 
chapter are not actually that commonplace. Incremental improvements on new 
inventions, arising through collaboration or knowledge networks and based on imitation, 
tweaking, translating, and diffusion, are the main means through which innovation 
happens. Innovation scholar Christopher Freeman describes the shift in emphasis in 
regulatory and policy work from radical innovations to “incremental” or sedimentary 
innovations: 
[R]adical innovations…tended to overshadow incremental innovations, both in policy making and in 
descriptive analysis for a long time. … an important change in emphasis in policy making [has been] 
the recognition that the vast majority of firms do not make radical innovations, but all can and should 
make incremental innovations and adopt new products processes first made by others.1  
A simple, one-move example of an incremental innovation would be Apple Corporation’s 
iPad. Unlike the obvious, seismic potential that smartphone technology was immediately 
recognized to have, the iPad’s launch was accompanied by debate about whether it was 
an innovation at all, or just a scaled-up version of an iPhone.2 With the smartphone as a 
cognitive anchoring device, it was difficult to imagine that an iPad might be something 
different, yet what seemed like just a difference in physical size altered the user 
                                                
1 Christopher Freeman, ‘The economics of technical change’, in Daniele Archibugi & Jonathan 
Michie (eds.), Trade, Growth and Technical Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), pp. 16-54, at 32. 
2 Brian Barrett, ‘The biggest mistake people made about the iPad’, Gizmodo, 9 March 2012, 
available at http://gizmodo.com/5891895/the-biggest-mistake-people-made-about-the-ipad.  
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experience in considerable ways, and gave rise to follow-on innovations and functions.3 
(Both phone and tablet also of course generated imitators.) 
Or, more subtly perhaps, consider rail safety: in July 2013, an unattended freight train 
carrying 72 cars of crude oil derailed and exploded in Lac Mégantic, Québec, causing 
forty-seven deaths.4 It produced one of the largest oil spills in Canadian history. Freight 
trains are not new, of course, and nor are oil spills. Yet the Lac Mégantic derailment 
serves as an example of the risks and unpredictability of sedimentary innovation. The 
sedimentary innovation here was a process one, of major rail shipment of crude oil 
products, stemming from increased oil prices and political pressures not to build 
pipelines, combined with railway deregulation,5 and inadequate enforcement6 to create 
serious gaps in rail safety. Leading up to the disaster, shale oil and bitumen transported 
by rail in Canada had increased from 500 carloads in 2009 to an estimated 140,000 
carloads in 2013, in an effort by oil companies to reap profits from the increase in oil 
prices then occurring.7 As Tim Shufelt writes, “For the Canadian oil patch, railways were 
an inelegant—if necessary—substitute for highly controversial pipelines.”8  
Another recent train derailment, in Oregon, introduces another element: the sheer weight 
of heavy crude oil versus its lighter variety. In June 2016, a train carrying heavy crude 
derailed in Oregon’s Columbia River Gorge, when a number of the bolts that fastened the 
tracks together were sheared off.9 Since 2001, US freight railways have only seen a 12% 
increase in the number of cars they transport, but after taking into account the weight and 
mileage that the system is subjected to, railroads have actually experienced a 24% 
increase in ‘ton-miles’.10 Like the Lac Mégantic disaster, the derailment in Oregon was a 
                                                
3 Or consider the fascinating story of the shipping container: Marc Levinson, The Box: How the 
Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
4 Bruce Campbell, ‘The Lac-Mégantic disaster: where does the buck stop?’, Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives, 23 October 2013, available at 
www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/commentary/lac-m%C3%A9gantic-where-does-buck-
stop. See also Transportation Safety Board of Canada, ‘Railway Investigation Report R13D0054’ 
(2014). 
5 Campbell, ‘Lac-Mégantic disaster’, note 4 above. 
6 Bruce Campbell Willful Blindness? Regulatory Failures Behind the Lac-Mégantic Disaster 
(Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2014), p. 8.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Tim Shufelt, ‘After the Lac-Mégantic disaster’, Canadian Business, 12 July 2013, available at 
www.canadianbusiness.com/companies-and-industries/after-the-lac-megantic-disaster/.  
9 Gillian Flaccus, ‘Officials want hold on oil trains after derailment’, Statesman Journal, 16 June 
2016, available at www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/2016/06/16/oregon-officials-want-
hold-oil-trains-derailment/86018886/. There were no injuries but the derailment forced 
evacuations in a nearby town and caused an oil spill into the river. 
10 Ralph Vartabedian, ‘Why are so many oil trains crashing? Track problems may be to blame’, 
Los Angeles Times, 7 October 2015, available at www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-crude-train-
safety-20151007-story.html. 
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multi-causal phenomenon. It was not caused solely by technological advances in oil 
extraction, or process innovations in transporting oil by rail, or because the properties of 
heavy crude undermine the safety of tank cars, or because of a lack of sufficient 
regulation. It was caused by each of these phenomena converging to intensify the strain 
on the system, making the track as a whole more prone to failure.  
In these examples are the hallmarks of the phenomenon I want to consider: 
“sedimentary” layers of innovation, each perhaps unremarkable on its own and not flashy 
in technological terms and yet, collectively, highly consequential. In contrast to seismic 
innovations, “sedimentary” (or incremental) innovations are built up through multiple 
small modifications to equipment or organization or use, made by engineers (including 
financial engineers), technicians, managers, salespeople, product users, and others.11 In 
high-risk, technologically complex environments like nuclear power plants, the accretion 
of small operator errors can produce catastrophic accidents, which are nevertheless 
“normal” in the sense that their causes are so common, unremarkable, and ultimately 
inevitable.12 As we know from Chapter 6, important sedimentary innovations may not 
always be underpinned by a significant technological change, or a clearly visible 
trajectory from specific technology to innovative outcome. Changes in business processes 
or in how and where a tool is deployed count too. The move to rely on rail to transport 
crude oil in these quantities is a process innovation, and produces manufactured risk, but 
its incremental development and multifactorial causes make it hard to detect until a 
focusing event, like a large oil spill, arises. By then much damage has been done. 
Our language and our literature are full of allegories for the problems posed by the small 
drip-drip of incremental change: one can suffer death by a thousand cuts, Gulliver was 
tied down by Lilliputians, there is a last straw that can break a camel’s back, and 
(apocryphally) frogs can be boiled alive if the water in a pot is heated gradually enough.13 
While the concept of sedimentary innovation is in some ways analogous to the more 
familiar idea of incremental innovation, the metaphor of sedimentary innovation also 
helps emphasize the dangers of gradually increasing, piling-up innovation in a way that 
the word incremental does not. Sedimentary innovation can bury the structures designed 
to contain it, and can fundamentally shift the landscape even while not appearing to be 
doing much at all. 
Alongside these darker images, we also have a romantic account of sedimentary 
innovation, just as we have a romantic account of seismic innovation. The image of 
vision-plus-perseverance as the basis of innovation, or the eccentric who, in the fullness 
                                                                                                                                            
In Oregon, trains carrying exclusively crude began running along this section of the Columbia 
river in 2014 (Flaccus, ‘Hold on oil trains’, note 9 above). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (New York: Basic 
Books, 1984). 
13 Actually, if a frog were placed in gradually heating water, it would try to escape as the 
temperature rose. See Karl S. Kruszelnicki, ‘Frog fable brought to boil’, Conservation Magazine, 
3 March 2011, available at http://conservationmagazine.org/2011/03/frog-fable-brought-to-boil/. 
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of time (and perhaps posthumously) was proved right, is a familiar cultural stock figure 
whose existence affirms the idea that imagination and hard work should ultimately pay 
off. Sedimentary innovations may be less magical in the popular imagination than the 
seismic form, but they too occupy a space in our normative, and narrative, universes. 
Sedimentary innovation also occupies a space in the flexible regulation literature, which 
we need to understand before we can delve more deeply into the ways in which 
sedimentary innovation not only intersects with but also represents a challenge for that 
literature. 
In this chapter, we go a bit deeper into the influence of networks, the first mover 
advantage, and the problem of innovative bricolage (“making do”) as each one affects our 
understanding of sedimentary innovation as a regulatory challenge. Thereafter we can 
consider the particular cognitive barriers that human beings encounter when trying to 
recognize sedimentary innovation accreting in real time. Finally, we turn to some 
possible regulatory responses to the challenges associated with dealing with sedimentary 
innovation in particular.  
Sedimentary innovation as regulatory opportunity and regulatory 
challenge 
The image of sedimentary innovation, and progress, underpins a range of pragmatist, 
experimentalist, and evidence-based regulatory prescriptions. In fact, the idea of 
incremental, step-by-step progress underlies important regulatory touchstones such as the 
“race to the top”, and the use of decentralization and competition to foster productive 
innovation. Because flexible regulation so often emphasizes the value of bottom-up 
learning, former US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis’s notion of multiple 
“laboratories” for democracy is a recurrent theme in flexible regulation scholarship. As 
Brandeis famously said, 
The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest the value of the process of 
trial and error. In large measure, these advances have been due to experimentation. …  
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.14 
Brandeis’s famous claim that federalism permits multiple laboratories for democracy in 
fact assumes sedimentary innovation: it establishes a legal architecture for running 
parallel experiments, with a view to increasing the rate of beneficial discoveries and 
innovations. Focusing on the upside potential of sedimentary innovation, Charles Sabel 
and his colleagues in particular have described developments in hospitals, prisons, 
schools and other public institutions in terms of the benefits that can arise from multiple 
laboratories. 15  The experimentalists adopt the term “bootstrapping” to describe the 
                                                
14 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 262, 56 (1932) (Brandeis J. dissenting). 
15 See, e.g., Charles Sabel & Michael Dorf, ‘A constitution of democratic experimentalism’ 
(1998) 98 Colum L Rev 298–473, at 267-473; James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, ‘A public 
laboratory Dewey barely imagined: the emerging model of school governance and legal reform’ 
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process in which incremental innovations in different jurisdictions create a structure 
conducive to experimentalism, arguing that it is a positive self-reinforcing process. 
Outside the federalism context, the same faith in permitting regulatory improvement by 
fostering private sector experimentation underpins the “regulatory sandbox” initiatives 
around fintech, which were launched in multiple jurisdictions in 2016.16 
Laboratory and sandbox initiatives can have many virtues in improving regulation, 
including by helping to develop best practices and giving regulators access to more 
detailed and up-to-date information about the ways in which industry actors are 
innovating. At the same time, we should remember that innovators may innovate not only 
to make markets more efficient, but also to avoid regulation; that there may not be 
external market backstops that can quickly assess and reflect back the social welfare 
benefits (or detriments) associated with financial innovations; that innovations will both 
develop and diffuse in hard-to-predict ways; and that even the bounds of a regulatory 
sandbox are not likely to be immune from the undermining effects of innovation. A 
regulatory sandbox focused on fintech innovations could find itself expanding its 
definition of what fintech is, or what kind of play is permitted in the sandbox. Especially 
in the context of growing inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition for fintech business 
                                                                                                                                            
(2003) 28 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 183-304. The idea of laboratories for democracy appears 
quite frequently in the flexible regulation literature as it is reflected in the database described in 
Chapter 4 above. In banking law, see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., ‘The expansion of state bank 
powers, the federal response, and the case for preserving the dual banking system’ (1990) 58 
Fordham L Rev 1133-256, at 1155-6. Other articles from the database that discuss the 
“laboratories for democracy” concept in some depth, in generally though not unequivocally 
positive terms, and which were cited within the database more than fifteen times are Daniel C. 
Esty, “Revitalizing environmental federalism’ (1996) 95 Mich L Rev 570-653; Orly Lobel, ‘The 
renew deal: the fall of regulation and the rise of governance in contemporary legal thought’ 
(2004) 89 Minn L Rev 342–470; Kristen Engel, Harnessing the benefits of dynamic federalism in 
environmental law’ (2006) 56 Emory LJ 159-90; William W. Buzbee, ‘Asymmetrical regulation: 
risk, preemption, and the floor/ceiling distinction’ (2007) 82 NYU L Rev 1547-619; and, David 
E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, ‘Adaptive federalism: the case against reallocating 
environmental regulatory authority’ (2008) 92 Minn L Rev 1796-850. Volume 50 Issue 3 of the 
Arizona Law Review also contains several papers compiled from a February 2008 conference 
entitled, “Constitutional Structures of Government Conference: Federalism and Climate Change,” 
in which the idea was examined. Other scholars are more skeptical. See, e.g., Ann Carlson, 
‘Iterative federalism and climate change’ (2009) 103 Nw UL Rev 1097; and David A. Super, 
Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law” 
157 U Pa L Rev 541 (2008) (with 13 and 9 cites respectively). 
16 See, e.g., Australian Securities and Investment Commission, ‘16-185MR ASIC consults on a 
regulatory sandbox licensing exemption’, available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-
centre/find-a-media-release/2016-releases/16-185mr-asic-consults-on-a-regulatory-sandbox-
licensing-exemption/; Ontario Securities Commission, OSC Launchpad, available at 
www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/osclaunchpad.htm; Singapore: Monetary Authority of Singapore, FinTech 
Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines (2016), available at www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-
Publications/Consultation-Paper/2016/Consultation-Paper-on-FinTech-Regulatory-Sandbox-
Guidelines.aspx; UK Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Regulatory sandbox’, available at www.the-
fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox. 
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– a factor that is influencing all this interest in sandboxes in the first place – we should be 
mindful of the possibility that private sector innovation could become the driver of the 
experiment to such a degree that public regulatory priorities are undermined. 
Regulatory competition for innovative financial work between London and New York 
has often been blamed for a general lowering of regulatory standards in the lead-up to the 
financial crisis. Regulatory competition within the United States also provoked increased 
innovativeness by American banks, but not without a price. As Art Wilmarth has noted, 
prior to the financial crisis, competition among US state banking regulators and between 
state and federal regulators promoted further instances of cooperative innovation between 
the private and public sectors. Competition helped generate a reflexive loop of regulatory 
innovation, ultimately producing very significant change. On the upside, Wilmarth points 
to private sector innovations that go on to achieve success once they are embraced and 
championed by regulatory actors, operating in competition with each other: 
[T]he dual banking system has permitted states to act as “laboratories” in experimenting with new 
banking products, structures, and supervisory approaches, and Congress has subsequently 
incorporated many of the states’ successful innovations into federal legislation. In addition to the 
examples … of checking accounts, bank branches, real estate loans, trust services, and NOW 
accounts, the state banking system originated reserve requirements, deposit insurance, adjustable-
rate mortgages, automated teller machines (“ATMs”), bank sales of insurance products, interstate 
electronic funds transfer systems, interstate bank holding companies, and supervisory agreements 
that promote cooperative oversight of multistate banking organizations by state bank regulators, the 
FRB, and the FDIC.17 
Ultimately, however, the downside revealed itself. Increasing competition between state 
and federal bank regulators then spurred further innovation, eventually in ways that 
threatened regulatory standards. The result of competition and innovation was pressure 
on regulators to adopt a more innovation-friendly and flexible stance: 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the [US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]’s success in 
obtaining court decisions expanding intrastate branching opportunities for national banks forced 
many states to adopt laws granting statewide branching privileges to state banks. During the same 
period, state initiatives allowing state banks to offer securities and insurance products encouraged 
federal regulators to take similar steps. These state and federal regulatory innovations helped 
persuade Congress to enact [the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act] in 1999, which removed legal barriers 
separating the banking industry from the securities and insurance businesses. Thus, the regulatory 
competition for bank charters has placed continuing pressure on state officials and the OCC to 
demonstrate that they can provide innovative, responsive, and cost-effective supervision to their 
regulated constituents.18 
                                                
17 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., ‘The OCC’s preemption rules exceed the agency’s authority and 
present a serious threat to the dual banking system and consumer protection’ (2004) 23 Ann Rev 
Banking & Fin L 225-364, at 259 [citations omitted].  
18 Wilmarth, ‘OCC’s preemption rules’, 259-26 [citations omitted], note 17 above. Wilmarth 
attributes the increase in competition to a competitive imbalance between state and federally 
chartered banks, which prior to 1980 had been more evenly matched. See also Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., ‘Transformation of the U.S. financial services industry, 1975-2000: competition, 
consolidation, and increased risks’ (2002) U Ill L Rev 215-476, at 441. Sometimes, private sector 
innovation can also force the hand of a regulator, or (as Wilmarth notes above) can help identify 
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Saule Omarova has also tracked how the business of banking changed over time. She 
looked at the way in which, from the mid 1980s onward, the OCC gradually broadened 
its statutory interpretation of what a bank does, using first the “look-through”, then the 
“functional equivalency”, and finally the “elastic definition” approach. Omarova 
emphasizes how at each stage, decisions by regulators precipitated the growth of 
financial innovation, allowing financial institutions to take greater and more complex 
risks. The relationship is a reciprocal and reflexive one. Moreover, like the innovations to 
which they contributed, the regulatory innovations were subtle, incremental, and operated 
“under the radar” in a way whose consequence could only be recognized in retrospect. As 
Omarova says,  
Contrary to an implicit assumption underlying most conventional explanations, the financial 
innovation of recent decades did not happen “naturally”; it was not some generalized evolutionary 
force but, to great extent, a product of policy choices and decisions by regulatory agencies. 
Moreover, some of the most influential of those decisions escaped public scrutiny because they were 
made in the subterranean world of administrative action invisible to the public, through agency 
interpretation and policy guidance. 
… It was not the highly visible acts of Congress but the seemingly mundane and often 
nontransparent actions of regulatory agencies that empowered the great transformation of the U.S. 
commercial banks from traditionally conservative deposit-taking and lending businesses into 
providers of wholesale financial risk management and intermediation services.19 
The banking story illustrates the nature of sedimentary innovation, as well as the 
relationship between regulatory innovation and private sector innovation: these are series 
of incremental changes, which collectively lay down a markedly different landscape than 
existed prior – even while a clean, coherent account may readily present itself only after 
the fact. In similar fashion, the broad-scale securitization of residential mortgages did not 
happen overnight. It took place, as did other moves toward maturity transformation, the 
speculative use of derivatives, and the growth of leverage, in incremental steps.20  
                                                                                                                                            
regulatory champions for an innovation not because it is in the public interest, but because it is in 
the regulator’s competitive interest vis-à-vis other regulators. This is one account of the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA), which restricted commercial banks from participating in the 
securities industry. Glass-Steagall was formally repealed via the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, better known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). The $70 
billion merger between Citicorp, Inc. and Travelers Group Inc., which violated certain provisions 
of the GSA and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, had already been announced before the 
GLBA’s initial draft was even approved (though it did not become legal under after the GLBA 
had been implemented). The biography of Sandy Weill, former chief executive and chairman of 
Citicorp, outlines the strategy employed by Weill and Citicorp Chairman John S. Reed, to force 
the repeal of the GSA. See Academy of Achievement, ‘Sanford Weill Biography – Academic of 
Achievement’, available at www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/wei0bio-1. 
19 Saule T. Omarova, ‘The quiet metamorphosis: how derivatives changed the “business of 
banking”’ (2009) 63 U Miami L Rev 1041-110, at 1044-5 [citations omitted]. 
20 Moreover, the availability of 30-year mortgages in the US has been connected to the ability to 
securitize those assets in the markets. Richard Green & Susan Wachter, ‘The American mortgage 
in historical and international context’ (2005) 19 J Econ Perspect 93-114; also Tobias Adrian & 
Hyun Song Shin, ‘Liquidity and leverage’ (2010) 19 J Financ Intermed 418-37.  
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The point is not that sedimentary innovation, laboratories for democracy or regulatory 
sandboxes are bad; far from it, they can in fact be very positive, especially if their 
promise is measured relative to easily-gamed bright-line regulatory rules. The point is 
simply that sedimentary innovation, like innovation generally, can exert powerful 
undermining forces on regulation itself across time. The fact that it is incremental change, 
which proceeds by degrees, can make it seem more benign in terms of its effects on 
regulation than it ultimately turns out to be. 
The impact of network effects: Brandeis and the “swarm” 
Examples like the railway oil spills, the evolution of banking, or the ABCP Crisis in 
Canada show how inputs from multiple different arenas – (a) increased oil prices plus 
political pressure not to build pipelines plus the sheer weight of heavy crude oil, for 
example; or (b) regulatory competition plus an evolving banking business model; or (c) 
the development of structured financial products and a new banking model, plus a global 
“savings glut” and low interest rates, plus a looming mortgage crisis next door – can 
together accrete into a new set of practices or conditions on the ground, which profoundly 
alter, in unexpected ways, the conditions with which regulation must grapple. 
Sedimentary innovation is a multifactorial phenomenon. What is more, the process by 
which sedimentary innovation accretes is an organic, contingent, somewhat unpredictable 
one that bears little resemblance to the clear, linear, mission-oriented innovative process 
we sometimes imagine.  
The experimentalist account of regulatory bootstrapping, and the deep potential of 
incremental change, is important. At the same time, managing sedimentary innovation – 
having the presence of mind to bootstrap the “right” things and curtail the “wrong” things 
– is a challenging prospect. Sedimentary innovation holds out the possibility of 
meaningful benefits, certainly; as an object of regulation, however, it can also be hard to 
see, and hard to handle. The first problem is our own human fallibility as identifiers of 
relevant information and as rational decision makers. Beyond that lie further problems 
that relate to the nature of innovation itself. 
Claude Lévi-Strauss coined the term bricolage in its current usage. The bricoleur, in 
Lévi-Strauss’s elegant twentieth century formulation, is someone who works with his or 
her hands. However, what distinguishes bricoleurs from other craftspeople is that while 
they are skilled in many diverse tasks, their projects do not depend on having particular 
materials or tools on hand. They make do. In Lévi-Strauss’s words, the bricoleur’s 
Universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever 
is at hand’, that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also 
heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any 
particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or 
enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The 
set of the ‘bricoleur’s’ means… is to be defined only by its potential use or… because the 
elements are collected or retained on the principle that ‘they may always come in handy’.21 
                                                
21 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1962), p. 11. 
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Sedimentary innovation can be marked by bricolage, whether one works with one’s 
hands or in more intangible realms like finance. In the financial context, Engelen et al. 
suggest that the idea of bricolage “has a double relevance to the process of financial 
innovation because it both describes the result of innovation, which … has become a 
series of fragile long chains and it also characterizes the activity of innovation by the 
bricoleur at one nodal point in a chain.”22 That is, the fragile long chains of innovation 
they describe are the product of financial intermediaries fashioning retail-ready financial 
products out of the wholesale material available, rent seeking at each juncture along the 
way. Bricolage is also occurring at each discrete nodal point, since “financial innovation 
does not correspond one-on-one with specific knowledge or technology”.23 Engelen et al. 
challenge the dominant accounts of financial innovation “in mainstream finance, social 
studies of finance and Marxist political economy which, all in different ways, argue or 
imply that science (represented by finance theory) or some other form of rationality (like 
class interest calculation) either is financial innovation or drives financial innovation”. 
Instead, they argue, bricolage undertaken under changing, unstable circumstances will 
produce, inherently, unstable long chain innovations like the complex structured products 
we saw in the run-up to the financial crisis.24  
The idea of bricolage is consistent with what we know about how innovation, including 
financial innovation, develops. Robert Merton once famously described what he called 
the “financial innovation spiral effect” – the idea that particularly useful or versatile 
financial innovations can spawn multiple knock-on financial innovations and collateral 
agreements. Once developed, a custom-made financial innovation can serve as a baseline 
for other commoditized agreements that ostensibly further fine-tune risk allocation 
between other parties. In Merton’s words, the “synthesizing of custom financial contracts 
and securities is for financial services what the assembly-line production process is for 
the manufacturing sector. Options, futures, and other exchange-traded securities are the 
raw ‘inputs’ applied in prescribed combinations …”25 
The spiral effect makes the path of financial innovation more complex and more 
unpredictable, and that complexity is then multiplied by its deployment within the 
complex, varied, and interconnected financial system. The financial system is a complex 
network of institutions such as domestic banks, overseas banks, central banks, insurance 
companies, and investment firms, and they are linked together in multiple ways: through 
                                                
22 Ewald Engelen et al. ‘Reconceptualizing financial innovation: frame, conjecture and bricolage’ 
(2010) 39 Econ & Soc’y 33-63, at 54. 
23 Ibid at 53-56. 
24 Arguably, relative to radical innovation, sedimentary innovation could be more amenable to 
rent-seeking as well – another function served by long chains of transactions in which 
intermediaries are involved at each step. Radical innovative contexts may be characterized by too 
much uncertainty to allow participants to identify or take advantage of interstitial rent-seeking 
opportunities. Once there is more collective experience with a particular innovation, however, 
there may be more incentive to tweak it in marginal ways, or add another layer of parties or 
detail, in ways that might capture particular benefits. 
25 Robert C. Merton, ‘Financial innovation and economic performance’ (1992) 4 Bank Am J Appl 
Corp Finance 12-22, at 19. 
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transactions, through products and services, through markets, and through the financial 
infrastructure of clearing, settlement, and trade depository functions. This is not a sea 
urchin-like “spike” of activity; it is a progressive spread. 
From a regulatory perspective, the complex network characterizing the financial sector 
also means that certain hubs, like Wall Street or the City of London, should attract 
particular scrutiny. So should financial institutions that by virtue of their size, 
relationships, or influence are key vectors for transmitting risk, and therefore are 
important to systemic stability.26 However, understanding the importance of networks to 
innovation is one thing, and defining relevant networks in a useful way is quite another. 
Financial system networks are multiple, variable, dynamic, and overlapping, and they can 
gain purchase at several different levels, as described below. They transmit innovations, 
as well as their effects (including risk), but the innovations are also altered, tweaked and 
repurposed as they diffuse. Financial network analysis is still in its early stages, though 
the US Treasury’s Office of Financial Research (OFR) considers it a “promising new 
tool”.27 In furtherance of this project, however, we cannot forget that institutional 
network connections are only one, and the most formal, of the kinds of networks that 
bind the financial system together. As the innovation literature points out, network ties 
can be formal or informal, and strong or weak. While formal contractual relationships 
may be the most important elements for purposes of transmitting risk, understanding how 
innovation is transmitted will be more complicated. Along with institutional network 
analysis, we will also want to consider social and financial geography. As well, we will 
want to understand the precise nature of the products in question: it turns out that as a 
function of weak property rights and strong competition, financial innovations may 
diffuse through networks in particular ways.  
Networks as institutional and social phenomena  
In the years since the financial crisis, network analysis based on computer simulations 
has begun to provide new insight into global financial interconnectedness and how such 
networks can or cannot absorb stress. Network analysis can help us develop a better 
image of the relationships through which goods, information, and risk all travel (even if 
any analysis will only provide a snapshot of a discrete moment in time). For example, 
when Sheri Markose and her colleagues modeled the US CDS market as of late 2007 and 
                                                
26 Post-crisis systemic risk regulation does in fact focus more on systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs, or, globally, G-SIFIS): see, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
‘Globally systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss 
absorbency requirement’ (2011), Bank for International Settlements, available at 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf. 
27 Stacey Schreft, ‘Map gives clearer picture of pathways that affect financial stability’ US 
Department of the Treasury, Office of Financial Research, 14 July 2016, available at 
https://financialresearch.gov/from-the-management-team/2016/07/14/map-gives-clearer-picture-
of-pathways/ (describing contagion, funding, and collateral network maps developed in recent 
OFR papers). 
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early 2008, they found J.P. Morgan to be the dominant bank in the network, followed by 
European banks, and then other US banks like Goldman Sachs and Citibank.28 
 
 
Figure 8.1 CDS Network (Markose, ‘Too interconnected to fail’, 640, note 28 above) 
Recent work by Richard Bookstaber and Dror Y. Kenett for the OFR breaks interbank 
relationships down in a more granular, if less visually networked, way. Focusing on 
former US investment bank Bear Stearns’s and two of its hedge funds during the 
financial crisis, their map identifies three layers of connections (across short-term 
funding, assets, and collateral flows) through which risk was transmitted across the 
financial system: 
                                                
28 Sheri Markose, Simone Giansanteb & Ali Rais Shagaghi, ‘Too interconnected to fail’ financial 
network of US CDS market: topological fragility and systemic risk’ (2012) 83 Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 627-46. 
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Figure 8.2 US Office of Financial Research, Three-Dimensional Multilayer Network Map of the Financial 
System (Source: Richard Bookstaber & Dror Y. Kenett, ‘Looking deeper, seeing more: a multilayer map of 
the financial system’, OFR Brief Series (14 July 2016) at p. 7) 
Schemas like these are helpful in understanding vectors along which risk may be 
transmitted. While there may be some overlap, financial innovation networks probably 
look somewhat different. If mapped, they could be equally useful in understanding how 
particular innovations are being transmitted. Yet as valuable as these institutional 
network maps may prove to be, mapping institutional connections for purposes of 
tracking innovation must incorporate insights from social geography as well.  
Within networks, geography – including social geography and cognitive geography – 
influences how innovative ideas diffuse, and how they evolve through diffusion. In some 
cases, physical geography may affect economic activity. Geographical proximity is a 
component that contributes to how and where network hubs develop, and isolation can 
have effects as well: for example, Hampton and Christensen have argued that small island 
economies can become locked into dependence on offshore finance, and therefore into 
tax haven activities.29 The rate of diffusion of consumer-facing financial innovations like 
                                                
29 Mark P. Hampton & John Christensen, ‘Offshore pariahs? Small island economies, tax havens, 
and the re-configuration of global finance’ (2002) 30 World Dev’t 1657-73. 
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ATMs, debit cards, and direct deposits can also depend heavily on the demographics of 
the market, including education, race/ethnicity, and age.30 Even despite heavy supply-side 
pressure to adopt innovations, the demand-side can be resistant to adopting innovations in 
certain contexts as a result of geography.  
But perhaps the most interesting aspect of the social geography of financial innovation, 
when considering innovation as a regulatory challenge, is the way in which “supply side” 
social networks seemingly influence the incremental development, diffusion and 
evolution of new technology, products and practices. Sociologist Donald MacKenzie has 
described the famous 1998 downfall of the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) in social network terms.31 Salomon Brothers, headed by John Meriwether, 
reputedly “the most talented bond trader of his generation”, developed LCTM’s, with 
Nobel laureate partners Robert Merton and Myron Scholes (both instrumental to 
developing and perfecting the Black-Scholes option pricing model discussed earlier).32 
The fund was so successful that other investors started imitating it, and the result was 
something of a “super-portfolio” of overlapping arbitrage positions. Network effects thus 
created unanticipated homogeneity, which in turn decreased the entire system’s stability 
and increased contagion effects.33  
What may have been especially important in the globalization of securitization is what 
we might call “cognitive geography”, or even the geography of professional social 
hierarchy: this is the sense that innovations diffuse out from knowledge or practice hubs, 
much in the way that Boaventura de Sousa Santos describes “focal objects” in his 
analogy of law to cartography.34 De Sousa Santos refers to the distortions that are 
unavoidable aspects of map-making as projection. Projection and distortion happen 
outward from a focal object determined by the context surrounding the creation of that 
particular map. De Sousa Santos applies the concept of “focal objects” to law, and argues 
that the legal accounts that are created with a particular focal object at their center will be 
distorted in various ways when moving out from that point. Financial innovation, too, 
seemingly rippled outward from financial network hubs in a way that demonstrated the 
intellectual and reputational sway of centers like London and New York.  
Reflecting on how local or regional crises beginning in the US subprime mortgage 
market could have turned into a global one, Roger Lee expresses surprise at:  
                                                
30 Eun-Ju Lee & Jinkook Lee, ‘Haven’t adopted electronic financial services yet? The acceptance 
and diffusion of electronic banking technologies’ (2002) 11 J Fin Couns & Planning 49-61. 
31 Donald Mackenzie, ‘Long-term capital management and the sociology of arbitrage’ (2003) 32 
Econ & Soc’y 349-80, at 352. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Wolf Wagner, ‘The homogenization of the financial system and financial crises’ (2008) 17 J 
Financ Intermed 330-56; Kartik Anand, et al., ‘A network model of financial system resilience’ 
(2013) 85 J Econ Behav & Org’n 219-35. 
34 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: a map of misreading. Toward a post-modern conception of 
law’ (1987) 14 JL & Soc’y 279-302; see also Cristie Ford, ‘Prospects for scalability: relationships 
and uncertainty in responsive regulation’ (2013) 7 Reg & Gov 14-29 (applying de Sousa Santos’s 
framework to responsive regulation). 
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[T]he geographical spread of the CDO market from New York to London, and then on to continental 
Europe (‘contra’ home bias and the historical significance of local markets). At that distance, 
decisions appear to have been made on the ‘reputations’ of offering banks, the claimed superior 
innovativeness of Anglo-American markets and the rumour-mill of actions taken by competing 
banks in other jurisdictions. Whereas institutions involved in currency trading have had to develop 
rigorous checks on cross-market positions on a 24/7/365 basis, this type of discipline was apparently 
not applied to participation in exotic products.35 
Lee notes that by taking on the known and unknown risks associated with the CDO 
market, institutions were effectively gambling on the stability of the Anglo-American 
markets. These institutions “joined (perhaps unwittingly) the leverage applied to those 
markets by agents who stood most to gain, at least in the short-term from the leverage 
game.”36 In other words, network hubs were not only better able to transmit their 
innovations, but the reputational sway they wielded – their status as focal objects, using 
de Sousa Santos’s cartographical metaphor – meant that other, more peripheral network 
players may also have been less likely to scrutinize those innovations. Diffusion took a 
particular form, which was the product not only of law and regulation, particular 
innovations, and network centrality, but of subjective reputational factors as well.  
Of course, social geography also meant that the crisis, like economic shocks generally, 
imposed a differential effect on the poor. Where unemployment rose in the US and UK, 
levels of malnutrition and even death were expected to rise in the poorest parts of the 
global economy. As Minouche Shafik, then the permanent Secretary of the UK’s 
Department for International Development, noted: 
[T]hose consequences are far more severe, frankly than anything we will experience as a result of 
this crisis... And this crisis is unfolding in poor countries more slowly more quietly and perhaps a bit 
less dramatically—its because the families who are having to cut back on the quality of food they 
eat are poor and isolated and in rural areas and so we don’t see them on the front page of the 
Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal but that doesn’t make the effect any less real.37 
Herding and the first mover advantage 
Along with institutional relationships and the impact of cognitive and social geography, a 
third consideration that can help us to understand sedimentary financial innovation is the 
nature of financial products themselves. As we discussed in Chapter 6, financial 
innovation is particularly susceptible to herding because financial innovations are 
characterized by weak property rights, meaning first movers have a considerable 
advantage.38 In addition, common incentive systems across financial institutions – a 
                                                
35 Roger Lee et al., ‘The remit of financial geography – before and after the crisis’ (2009) 9 J 
Econ Geog 723-47, at 731 [citations omitted]. 
36 Ibid at 732.  
37 Current Affairs, BBC Radio 4 broadcast, 19 March 2009, available at 
news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/analysis/transcripts/19_03_09.txt (As quoted in 
Lee, ‘Remit of financial geography’, 742, note 35 above). 
38 Engelen puts it more colorfully, and perhaps more cynically, than most: 
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short-term profit orientation and the bonus structure, for example – gave each bank an 
incentive to evade capital requirements and take risks so long as its competitors were 
doing the same, generating a collective action problem.39 
This was not the case back in 1931, when John Maynard Keynes famously observed that 
“[a] ‘sound’ banker, alas! is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, 
when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way along with his fellows, 
so that no one can really blame him.”40 Banking has changed utterly, and is now an 
innovative industry where once it was a sleepy one. And yet based on a different set of 
economic drivers, Chuck Prince, Citigroup CEO, uttered a strikingly similar conformist 
sentiment in 2007. Dismissing concerns about liquidity in the credit-fuelled economy, he 
just as famously said, “[w]hen the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be 
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”41  
Consider that the following factors operate simultaneously and can reinforce each other: 
the pre-crisis environment was innovative in part because of the first mover advantage. It 
was susceptible to collective action problems because of the additional incentive 
structures that operated within its institutions. Regulators who were seeking to be nimble 
and flexible in a competitive regulatory environment endorsed innovative activity. 
Innovations diffused in complicated and hard-to-track ways through institutional 
interconnections, but also as a result of the social and reputational sway that particular 
hubs enjoyed. And, the innovations in question were often the product of a process of 
                                                                                                                                            
In the absence of a general system of property rights in financial innovation, novelty and 
rapid upscaling are critical because doing the same thing year after year brings in 
imitators and encourages commodification, which reduces first-mover high profits for the 
institution and high bonuses for the individual. While newness in itself is no guarantee of 
success, novelty matters within each conjuncture. This incidentally also limits collective 
memory and respect for older, established members among intermediary groups. More 
exactly, what matters is scalable differentiation because the high margins on financial 
innovation are generally taken early in the product cycle. In a world where profit 
arithmetically equals margins times volume, the intermediaries of the financial sector 
(just like big pharmaceutical firms) need not have striking originality but can instead 
pursue differentiation and mass sales through a succession of blockbusters. The last 
conjuncture’s blockbuster was securitization in the wholesale markets which spawned 
umpteen differentiations that could be scaled up, generating large volume and fees, above 
all because they connected with retail feedstock from mass saving and borrowing. 
Ewald Engelen et al., ‘Reconceptualizing financial innovation: frame, conjuncture and bricolage’ 
(2010) 39 Econ & Soc’y 33-63. 
39 Peter Haiss, ‘Bank herding and incentive systems as catalysts for the financial crisis’ (2010) 7 
IUP J Behav Fin 30-58 (arguing that herding behavior provoked by common incentive systems 
between banks may have been one of the causes of the financial crisis). 
40 John Maynard Keynes, ‘The consequences to the banks of the collapse of money values’, in 
Essays in Persuasion (London: MacMillan and Co., 1931), p. 168.  
41 Michiyo Nakamoto & David Weighton, ‘Citigroup chief stays bullish on buy-outs’, Financial 
Times, 9 July 2007, available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz30ZjjRf3M.  
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bricolage that gave the impression that each incremental evolution was relatively 
unremarkable. Even while regulators were working to be receptive to financial 
innovation, they were not in a position to really understand how far from safety those 
innovations had taken them.  
Making sense of sedimentary innovation 
Humans struggle to see sedimentary change  
We probably all know, by now, that humans are not terribly good decision makers under 
all conditions. For example, we tend overall to read too much into things that make a 
forceful impression on us, particularly where we have personal experience with them, and 
we read too little into things that do not make such an impression. Thanks to the 
availability heuristic, we also tend to confuse how easy it is to bring an example of 
something to mind with the probability it will occur (e.g. my friend lost money to a 
pump-and-dump scheme, so losing money in pump-and-dump schemes must be more 
common than I thought).42 Perhaps for this reason, when making inter-temporal choices, 
we tend to value the present more than the future.43 When calibrating the costs of low-
probability, high-impact events – something else we struggle with, and which affects our 
thinking about seismic innovations too – we tend to discount future events even more. 
Thanks to anchoring and adjustment, we are also liable to judge future probabilities by 
reference to pre-existing starting points, which may or may not be reasonable or even 
relevant to the question at hand. Then, we tend to see what we want (or expect) to see. 
Confirmation bias, meaning the tendency to interpret evidence in a way that confirms 
existing beliefs and expectations,44 distorts our perception of risk and inhibits our ability 
to see the unexpected, including the kinds of unexpected developments that may arise 
from sedimentary innovation.45 Nor are we especially numerate. Anything above basic 
numeracy, like the complex probabilities that characterize risk, is challenging for most of 
us.46  
Humans’ familiar and predictable cognitive limitations take a particular form when it 
comes to sedimentary innovation. Put bluntly, we do a poor job of registering more 
incremental phenomena. We are simply not wired to detect gradual change very well.47 In 
                                                
42 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases’ 
(1974) 185 Science 1124-31. 
43 Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, ‘Time discounting and time 
preference: a critical review’ (2002) 40 J Econ Lit 351-401. 
44 Raymond S. Nickerson, ‘Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises’ (1998) 
2 Rev Gen Psych 175-220.  
45 Lennart Sjöberg, ‘Factors in risk perception’ (2002) 20 Risk Anal 1-12; Tversky & Kahneman, 
‘Judgement under uncertainty’, note 42 above. 
46 John Allen Paulos, Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and its Consequences (New York: Hill 
& Wang, 1988). 
47 E.g., Daniel J. Simons, Steven L Franconeri & Rebecca L Reimer, ‘Change blindness in the 
absence of a visual disruption’ (2000) 29 Perception 1143-54; Philip M. Groves & Richard F. 
Thompson, ‘Habituation: a dual-process theory’ (1970) 77 Psych Rev 419-50. 
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psychology, Weber’s Law says that humans’ ability to detect differences in the 
magnitude of a stimulus will depend on how large it is relative to the background 
situation. For example, while most people can hear a whispered voice in a quiet room, 
they may not notice someone shouting in their ear at a rock concert if the shouting is not 
louder, by a certain minimum proportion, than the background concert noise.48 We 
acclimatize; we habituate; we become “change blind”. How we respond to risk will be a 
function of how much risk we are already taking (as anyone who has ever traded a large 
debt in for a larger one knows). How much we register change, meaning innovation, will 
also be a function of how much change and innovation we are used to. Thus sedimentary 
innovation can escape notice and, absent a focusing event, we seem able to become 
accustomed to very high levels of risk so long as it accretes slowly.  
There is more. We may over-extrapolate from our own experience, and assume too much 
about what we do not know. We may anchor our perception of risk to something that has 
proven not to be risky for us individually (statistics notwithstanding), or not risky at our 
particular scale. For example, we may imagine that a financial innovation that seemingly 
presents low risk to the firm that developed it also poses a low level of risk to an entire 
sector, to systemic stability, or to society generally. Or, because a past financial 
innovation was considered to be low-risk, a newer and similar but in fact much riskier 
financial innovation may be judged to be lower-risk than it is because we mentally 
characterize it as only an adjustment to, and recognizable in the terms of, the earlier low-
risk innovation.  
On the other hand, we tend to jump to conclusions about significance when confronted 
with striking events. They cause us to see patterns and discern pressing, widespread 
problems. As Rajeev Gowda says, 
[P]eople can be readily persuaded that a few examples of unfortunate results are an adequate 
representation of a policy's overall performance. Presenting a sequence of inferences which seem 
believable may persuade people towards such conclusions. This could lead to support for an 
unwarranted overhaul of the policy. The representativeness heuristic could also affect people's 
willingness to support risk management policies, e.g., flood risk-reduction measures, if the adduced 
sequence of future events leading to such disasters does not seem believable.49 
This suggests, as already discussed, that the decision to frame an identified innovation as 
seismic can open windows of opportunity for regulatory action. By contrast, sedimentary 
innovations do not register with the same significance. In the regulatory context, this 
means that (to the extent we think about regulation at all when things seem to be going 
fine), even if we understand that sedimentary innovation is more common and often more 
influential, we may still respond rather too listlessly to it, because of the absence of a 
striking event.  
                                                
48 James E. Ferrell Jr., ‘Signaling motifs and Weber’s law’ (2009) 36 Molecular Cell 724-7.  
49 M. V. Rajeev Gowda, ‘Heuristics, biases and the regulation of risk’ (1999) 32 Policy Sci 59-78, 
at 62-3. 
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The biases and heuristics above are only some of the reasons why our rationality is 
bounded.50 Humans do not always even try to operate on a rational plane. We are also 
emotional beings, and our decision-making process can be influenced, or even 
dominated, by emotion.51 Fear and anxiety can be strong emotional drivers of regulation 
and risk-related decision-making. Consider the heavy regulatory burden imposed on 
nuclear power compared to conventional fossil fuels. As journalist William Saletan noted 
when writing on the Fukushima crisis, there have only been 31 direct fatalities from 
nuclear power in the last 40 years, but over 20,000 in the oil supply chain and 15,000 in 
the coal supply chain. The ratio of fatalities per unit of energy produced is 18 times 
greater for oil than for nuclear energy.52 Yet the fear of nuclear disaster provokes dread in 
a way that a steady stream of conventional fatalities does not, and to a substantial degree 
we regulate in response to our dread.53  
We also experience anxiety where we perceive something as unknown, and where we 
cannot (rightly or mistakenly) slot it into a pre-existing narrative. Therefore phenomena 
that seem new or different inspire more regulation than phenomena that seem like an 
extension of the familiar.54 How vivid the imagery associated with a bad event, and how 
far into the future it may occur, also influence its emotional valence.55 Sedimentary 
innovation is less unfamiliar and less emotionally evocative. In contrast to seismic 
innovation events, where particularly after a disaster risk is salient and people may over-
estimate risk and over-regulate, when it comes to sedimentary innovation people may 
persistently under-estimate risk and under-regulate. This may be even more the case for 
financial risk, because it tends to be counterbalanced by the glittering promise of 
financial return. As well, financial risk tends not to generate the same imagery as, for 
example, environmental risk. The media-ready images of physical destruction, tar-
covered shore birds or children being tested for toxin-related illnesses are absent.  
Finally, the status quo bias also contributes to our passivity in the fact of sedimentary 
innovation. Given the choice, humans generally tend to prefer to maintain the status quo 
or to refrain from acting.56 The status quo and confirmation biases may make us 
                                                
50 For a review on bounded rationality, see Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten (eds.), Bounded 
Rationality: The Adaptive Toolkit (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). Frank Knight was also an early 
pioneer in exploring how people make decisions in with limited information: see Tim Rakow, 
‘Risk, uncertainty and prophet: the psychological insights of Frank H. Knight’ (2010) 5 Judgment 
and Decision Making 458-66. 
51 Paul Slovic et al., ‘Risk as analysis and risk as feelings: some thoughts about affect, reason, 
risk, and rationality’ (2004) 24 Risk Anal 311-22. 
52 William Saletan, ‘Nuclear overreactors’, Slate, 14 March 2011, available at 
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/03/nuclear_overreactors.html. 
53 Paul Slovic, ‘Perception of risk’ (1987) 236 Science 280-5. 
54 George F. Loewenstein et al., ‘Risk as feelings’ (2001) 127 Psych Bull 267-86, at 267-86. 
55 Ibid at 275-78. 
56 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, ‘Status quo bias in decision making’ (1988) 1 J 
Risk Uncertainty 7-59. This can partly be explained by the endowment effect and risk aversion: 
better the devil you know. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, ‘Anomalies: 
the endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias’ (1991) 5 J Econ Perspect 193-206. 
CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE, CHAPTER 8  
(NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FORTHCOMING 2017)  
 
 19 
unwilling to recognize, in the absence of a striking event, that facts on the ground have 
changed and demand a response. Coupled with the prospect theory – that we tend to 
value avoiding potential losses over having potential gains – these biases may help 
explain why regulators may be more inclined to act aggressively ex post than 
comprehensively ex ante. Why change anything if there is no salient risk? Why “take the 
punch bowl away” when everyone is enjoying the party and nothing bad has happened?57 
This presents a form of slippery slope problem as well, for both regulators and firms, in 
terms of accountability. Let us imagine that early on in the trajectory of some financial 
innovation, matters seem stable. There is risk associated with the innovation, but it seems 
to be operating within a tolerable range. With every day that sedimentary innovation 
accretes, the regulator (and the firm’s compliance personnel) will have to consider afresh 
not one, but two questions: the first is whether the risk has now exceeded tolerable levels. 
The second, equally difficult one, is: why intervene today when we did not intervene 
yesterday? The regulator must not only justify its present intervention, but somehow 
establish the difficult claim that some de minimis change suddenly justifies acting, even 
though yesterday the regulator had judged in all its wisdom that things were fine. In 
settings such as this, the human mind opts for consistency, rejecting a potentially 
awkward change in posture, until disaster ensues.58 
Epistemological problems and awareness problems 
One other cognitive bias hints at the larger epistemological problem that underlies 
sedimentary innovation as a regulatory challenge: the hindsight bias. The hindsight bias 
causes us to imagine, after viewing an outcome, that that outcome was always clear.59 
The hindsight bias influences policy evaluation. As Gowda says, 
When faced with negative outcomes, the hindsight bias may lead people to criticize the decisions 
leading to failure as if the negative outcome should have been foreseen as inevitable rather than 
merely probable. Closely related to the hindsight bias, the outcome bias leads people to judge the 
goodness of risk-related decisions on the basis of their outcomes….The hindsight and outcome 
                                                                                                                                            
Emotions seem to play a role as well: Antoinette Nicolle et al., ‘A regret-induced status quo bias’ 
(2011) 31 The Journal of Neuroscience 3320-7. 
57 See William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1951 to 1970, in a 
speech to the New York Group of the Investment Bankers Association of America: “In the field 
of monetary and credit policy, precautionary action to prevent inflationary excesses is bound to 
have onerous effects – if it did not it would be ineffective and futile. Those who have the task of 
making such policy don’t expect you to applaud. The Federal Reserve, as one writer put it, after 
the recent increase in the discount rate, is in the position of the chaperone who has ordered the 
punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up.” William McChesney Martin, 
Speech (19 October 1955), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/martin55_1019.pdf.  
58 Donald C. Langevoort, ‘Getting (too) comfortable: In-house lawyers, enterprise risk, and the 
financial crisis’ (2012) Wis L Rev 495-519, at 511-12. 
59 Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, ‘Hindsight: biased judgments of past events after the 
outcomes are known’ (1990) 107 Psych Bull 311-27.  
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biases could generate charges of incompetence or corruption to explain the failures of policies which 
may have failed by chance.60 
These biases also make it simpler for us to conclude after the fact that we were mistaken 
to ever have run the risks we did. For example, while in view of the retrofitting costs we 
may honestly have imagined in 2010 that we were willing to run the tiny risk of an 
enormous tsunami flooding a major nuclear power plant in central Japan, it feels quite 
impossible to sustain that view in mid-2011, after a disaster has occurred. But the fact 
that the terrible thing happened does not mean that we had not measured the risk, and 
(even if not in this case, then in others) been willing to run it earlier. Our societies could 
not function without running some risks. Our after-the-fact assessment of which risks 
have been worth running is heavily skewed by which risks actually came, perhaps just by 
chance, to pass. 
The hindsight and outcome biases are a problem for policy analysis regardless of the 
subject matter or innovation in question. However, the particular way in which they 
manifest in regard to sedimentary innovation is that they imposes ex post a level of 
certainty that simply was not present ex ante. They suggest not only that damage could 
and should have been avoided, but also that we can do better in avoiding it next time. In 
other words, when it comes to sedimentary innovation, the hindsight bias blinds us to the 
persistence of uncertainty itself. Every effort to improve regulation and avoid future 
harms – including the one we are engaged in here – is based on the idea that we can avoid 
regret later, if only we improve our risk management processes enough. 
In fact, we are hampered by our inability to see, in the moment, precisely what is going 
on. Anticipating problems or identifying key turning points, in a complex world full of 
noisy signals, is extraordinarily difficult.61 Moreover, it is impossible to predict which of 
multiple possible or probable outcomes will actually come to pass. This is not necessarily 
(or not only) a function of our limited ability to think clearly, to separate the causal wheat 
from the epiphenomenal chaff. It is also a function of the complex nature of causation. 
So, while there is a behavioral component to the challenge of regulating, including 
regulating sedimentary innovation, there is also a more fundamental epistemological one. 
What may be less immediately obvious is how fragile any such coherent explanation is 
bound to be. Though it is no less true of the seismic innovation story, it is especially with 
respect to sedimentary innovation that we can see the contingency and subjectivity in the 
causal account. The causal account of the relationship between regulation and 
sedimentary innovation is a complex one. Like determining proximate cause of injury in 
a complex tort situation, determining (or predicting) how technological change and 
sedimentary innovation will co-evolve is an indeterminate process. Understanding 
financial innovation as most often a form of sedimentary, rather than seismic, innovation 
may be a useful analytical lens, because it yields a different interpretation of the problem 
at hand and generates different prescriptions for its resolution. At the same time, we need 
                                                
60 Gowda, ‘Heuristics’, 63, note 49 above. 
61 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). 
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to be alive to the ways in which this account, like any other, cannot be more than partial 
and imperfect in its ex post explanations.  
Regulatory boundaries and coordination problems 
Another aspect of the phenomenon of sedimentary innovation is that in complex, 
multipart systems, sometimes very consequential events happen in the interstices between 
existing regulatory regimes, or regulatory moments, or regulatory objects. Each 
component of regulation may focus on the “main effect”, from its vantage point, and miss 
developments in the cracks in between. The anchoring effect of existing regulatory 
structures makes us harder to see interstitial phenomena with the color and depth that 
more central objects have. The legibility of a new innovation is a challenge for 
sedimentary innovations just as it is for seismic ones. 
Entities operate within a complex factual and regulatory matrix, with layers of rules. 
Regulators may not see the connections between how public and private regulations 
interact, or how transnational and domestic regulations interact. 62  Transnational 
governance does not overpower domestic legal regimes, but rather intersects with 
domestic and customary systems to generate elaborate combinations of regulations.63 
Even leaving aside the impact of complexities such as private ordering and transnational 
regimes, it seems difficult to coordinate formal regulatory regimes.64 
Moreover, interactions may not be obvious because different regulators may interact in 
unanticipated ways. Consider the relationship between bankruptcy law, the capital 
requirements imposed on financial institutions, and housing policy in the United States 
pre-crisis. Presumably the size and robustness of the subprime mortgage market was not 
the main concern of the Recourse Rule in the United States, which allowed financial 
institutions to keep only one fifth as much capital on hand to cover triple-A rated 
mortgage-backed securities as for business and consumer loans.65 Capital adequacy, not 
housing policy or access to credit, was the Rule’s concern. Similarly, 2005 amendments 
to American bankruptcy provisions in 200566 expanded the definitions of a “repurchase 
agreement” (a “repo” agreement) to include mortgage loans, and interest on mortgage 
loans.67 These amendments had the effect of facilitating the expansion of short-term repo 
financing. However, they also distorted creditor behavior and increased systemic risk.68 
                                                
62 Tim Bartley, ‘Transnational governance as the layering of rules: intersection of public and 
private standards’ (2011) 12 Theoretical Inq L 517-42. 
63 Ibid at 541. 
64 Carol A. Heimer, ‘Disarticulated responsiveness: the theory and practice of responsive 
regulation in multi-layered systems’ (2011) 44 UBC L Rev 663-93, at 666-71.  
65 Jeffrey Friedman & Wladimir Kraus, Engineering the Financial Crisis (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), p. 2.  
66 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109–8, 119 Stat. 
23, codified in various sections of 11 USC. 
67 Stephen J. Lubben, ‘The Bankruptcy Code without safe harbors’ (2010) 84 Am Bankr LJ 123-
44, at 138-40. 
68 Ibid. 
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The amendments essentially subsidized derivative financial activity with bankruptcy 
benefits, thus increasing the use of derivatives and reducing market discipline.69 Of 
course, neither the derivative markets nor housing and mortgage policy was the 
Bankruptcy Code’s main concern. The same is true of the relationship between capital 
adequacy rules and macroeconomics – they interacted in unexpected ways, effectively 
increasing the money supply and fueling an asset price bubble in housing.70  
It is difficult in the abstract to do enough systematic comparison of the interactions 
between different regulatory regimes or strategies, and this is a problem that exacerbates 
and is exacerbated by sedimentary innovation. Coordination failure between regulators is 
a familiar problem, not limited to the innovation context, but it is a problem that is 
particularly relevant to the regulatory challenge that sedimentary innovation presents. 
These, too, are incorporated into the technical roadmap in this book’s concluding chapter. 
Sedimentary innovation and flexible regulation 
As we know by now, bright-line rules’ rigidity in the face of incremental innovation 
makes it likely that the rules will be out of step almost by the time they are promulgated. 
Flexible regulation, which lays out a more nuanced and variable set of regulatory options, 
has been in part a response to that problem. Among the regulatory options it lays out is 
the idea of having a regulator set high-level principles or outcomes that regulated entities 
must meet, while leaving the details of implementation to the regulated actors 
themselves. In principle, this is the kind of system that should be able to adapt to 
sedimentary innovations while keeping sight of “big picture” regulatory objectives. 
However, as the Volcker Rule account in Chapter 1 pointed out, moving the discussion of 
details to the technocratic plane can neutralize public participation, and it allocates 
substantial influence to those still in the room after the public moment has passed. Worse 
yet, if an agreement on principles or high-level outcomes is in fact masking the 
regulatory incapacity to understand or work with the actual firm-driven innovations being 
developed – as was the case in the UK around principles-based prudential regulation,71 or 
in the US around the CSE Program72 – then the regulator will simply have ceded the 
regulatory field to private actors. The crucial difference between what Ayres and 
Braithwaite call “enforced self-regulation”73 on the one hand, and outright deregulation 
on the other, is precisely there. It matters very much what back-end processes are in 
                                                
69 Mark J. Roe, ‘The derivatives market’s payment priorities as financial crisis accelerator’ (2011) 
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70 Erik F. Gerding, ‘Credit derivatives, leverage, and financial regulation's missing 
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place, exactly, through which indeterminacy will be resolved and the spaces in regulatory 
scaffolding filled in. Sedimentary innovation can undermine flexible regulatory 
structures, like other regulatory structures, if the regulator is not possessed of 
considerable capacity to register change across time, including effects outside the discrete 
regulatory moment at issue, and to appreciate its potential impact and the necessary 
responses to it. 
We should flag two other potential problems that might be particularly associated with 
flexible regulation and sedimentary innovation. The first is that, as the Basel II capital 
adequacy account, or Omarova’s description of the changing nature of the “business of 
banking” makes clear, flexible regulatory structures can actually increase the speed and 
prevalence of sedimentary innovation. Jeffrey Gordon has engagingly demonstrated that 
in a “constructed system” like financial regulation, any new, non-trivial change to the 
regulatory regime alters the context in which it operates.74 Regulation changes behavior. 
In Gordon’s words, “regulatory benchmarks inevitably become a management target; the 
exogenous becomes endogenous.”75 In such a reflexive system, a regime that puts private 
sector innovation-embracing strategies at the core of its own standards, as Basel II or 
banking regulation did, can expect one of its outputs to be more private sector innovation. 
Second, we should be aware of the ways in which the particular structure of regulation 
may not be well situated to deal with sedimentary innovation. Risk-based regulation, one 
of the touchstone concepts within flexible regulation, may be such a structure. 
Specifically, Julia Black and Robert Baldwin have pointed out that in risk-based 
regulation, “the tendency is for regulators' gaze to be drawn to their highest risks and for 
regulators to be encouraged to pull back resources from lower risks.”76 Risks that 
individually look low may never trip the alarm in such a system, notwithstanding that 
collectively they may be very significant. Nor do we understand the interactions between 
them in a complex system. Sedimentary innovation, too, can appear innocuous to a risk-
based regulator until it has progressed well down the road, and – because it develops 
incrementally, through the actions of multiple parties and in response to multiple stimuli 
– by that time it can be very difficult to unwind. As difficult a task as it may be, 
developing viable regulatory responses to extensive and continuous private sector 
innovation requires careful attention to these interactions, and an appreciation for just 
how much regulatory structure interacts with and is affected by private sector innovation 
taking place within its bounds. 
Potential regulatory responses to sedimentary innovation 
In terms of potential regulatory responses, first should be the recognition that loopholes 
and disconnects will be exploited. Innovation presents a clear and persistent risk – 
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75 Ibid at 374. 
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perhaps the single most significant and under-analyzed risk – to regulation itself. We can 
and should improve on the quality of information we have about just how sedimentary 
innovation works its way through, and in the process expands, the spaces and arbitrage 
opportunities within the regulatory fabric. Better harmonization and collaboration 
between financial regulatory regimes domestically and transnationally (including around 
accounting rules, prudential regulation, bankruptcy, and living wills) would also help 
reduce opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.77 In the run-up to the financial crisis, 
private parties engaged in regulatory arbitrage between overlapping US regulators.78 
Transnational arbitrage, prominently between New York and London, also played a role. 
Gaps such as these can be addressed, and we can design incentives that reward better 
decision-making by banks and seek to limit herding behavior.79  
But all of that is familiar ground. While useful, these suggestions do not respond to the 
question of how better to understand sedimentary innovation and its effects; nor do they 
address the epistemological and awareness problems that dog our efforts. There is no 
regulatory silver bullet. Yet promising options exist that can help to augment regulatory 
capacity to track and respond to sedimentary innovation.  
As we have noted, developing a better understanding for how financial innovation 
develops – considering market structure, incentives, transmission vectors, and the 
presence or absence of “off” switches – is key to being able to understand innovative 
phenomena as they grow and to appreciate some of the ways in which it may be 
undermining, circumventing or swamping regulatory structures. It may be useful to draw 
on experience about the parts of the financial system that seemed to remain stable or 
enforceable while others did not.80 It may be useful to consider, as well, taking steps to 
identify those areas where financial institutions already have some incentive to self-
regulate, for self-interested reasons, and those where they do not.81 Without relying too 
heavily, or at all, on assumptions about the reliability of self-regulation, this may provide 
the opposite piece of information: a preliminary indication of what priorities most 
urgently need to have regulatory resources allocated to them.  
Second, there is value in more explicitly considering the ways in which regulators, along 
with the rest of us, struggle to make sense of sedimentary innovation as it is developing. 
Are there ways that we might improve this capacity? The first way would be to take 
intentional steps to build better analytical capacity of the kind needed not just to 
understand the industry (though that is obviously essential), but also to identify 
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behavioral cascades earlier, and to track “creep” in industry assumptions or standard 
practices over time. In the United States, the OFR has a mandate that can encompass 
these kinds of efforts.82 A compatible suggestion would be Chuck Whitehead’s, that 
regulators adopt a “Goldilocks Approach,” meaning an approach whereby regulators are 
authorized to roll out, suspend or forgo regulatory steps over time, as information and 
experience improve understanding.83  
It may also make sense to build an “institutional contrarian” role into the regulatory 
environment, particularly where regulators may be participating in sandbox exercises or 
other semi-collaborative engagements with private innovators. Regulatory contrarians as 
Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz describe them are “devil’s advocates”, with three 
key characteristics: 1) they are in a position of persuasive authority with access to media 
and officials (or, here, decision makers within the regulator), 2) they are affiliated with a 
regulatory entity but independent, and 3) they study the regulatory process to suggest 
improvements and point out flaws (or, as modified here, to point out assumptions or 
misperceptions about innovation that could undermine regulation).84 Including a diversity 
of voices within a regulatory structure, combined with a formal structural role for 
presenting alternative views, may help increase the chances that a regulator will be able 
to identify, make sense of, and respond to sedimentary innovation in a timely and well-
calibrated manner. 
Third, regulators will want to understand sedimentary financial innovation as the 
network-based phenomenon that indeed it seems to be. This approach counsels treating 
the industry ecosystem as a network and focusing on its hubs rather than on specific 
instruments or institutions. 85  It would mean recognizing that in regulatory terms, 
diffusion and herd behavior based on overall social and geographical networks can be 
just as problematic, in the aggregate, as any one institution that is considered “too big to 
fail” or “too interconnected to fail” on its own. Risk-based regulation that relies on 
bright-line matrices, like threshold asset size, risks missing important aggregate effects. 
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In addition, regulation could focus on breaking the connections through which 
sedimentary innovation diffuses, in the way that systemic risk management tries to do 
with respect to systemic risk. Using an engineering based approach as Steven Schwarz 
has suggested to manage systemic risk, regulators could also choose to implement 
modularity within innovation networks – for example, by closing off some components 
and only allowing them to interact with others in certain ways, to make it possible to 
repair the component before the entire system fails.86 No doubt, this idea will be less 
popular with respect to the prospect of cabining innovation than it is for cabining risk. 
Whether it is a tool worth deploying would depend on the regulator’s (and perhaps the 
broader policy-maker’s) assessment of how many other safeguards were in place to 
manage the disadvantages associated with a particular sedimentary innovation, and 
whether it made sense to try to close off the innovation, rather than ex ante to try to close 
off the risks associated with it. Yet for innovations that, in policy-makers’ estimation, 
seem over time to have lost their social value – such as financial innovations that a policy 
maker has determined have no function other than rent seeking – it is an approach that 
should not be dismissed out of hand. 
Each of these options, and combinations of them, may make sense as responses to 
sedimentary innovation. The challenge will be to develop regulatory capacity and to 
implement these measures in a much more thorough and effective way than has been 
attempted so far, in keeping with the magnitude of the challenge that innovation presents 
for regulation’s ability to meet its other, substantive, goals. 
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